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Designing Dupes: A Legislative
Proposal for Holding Online
Marketplaces Contributorily
Liable for Counterfeit Goods
Gina Boone*
With a simple click on your favorite online marketplace, any
consumer can unknowingly buy counterfeit goods. Counterfeits are
no longer limited to fake luxury bags on the streets of Chinatown.
These dupes can be roller skates, children’s toys, and even car tires.
However, counterfeit products’ impact reaches far beyond just consumer health and safety. Counterfeiting negatively affects small
businesses, imposes financial burdens, and causes reputational
damage. Online marketplaces are aware of the increase of counterfeit products on their websites. Yet, they continue to facilitate its
growth because it is unlikely the online platforms will be held liable
for the sale of counterfeit goods. Left with very little options,
rightsholders often suffer and consumers are unaware of the dangers. In light of these growing concerns, Congress recognizes the
need for anti-counterfeiting legislation. Expanding contributory
trademark liability could be the most effective way to address this
need, but representatives have left anti-counterfeiting law
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vulnerable. This Note addresses the tension between rightsholders
and online marketplaces and proposes regulatory solutions to provide more guidance for anti-counterfeiting legislation.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2013, Mindy McCarthy—owner of the Etsy store MinMac—
started her jewelry company to generate income while raising her
children.1 She focused on her packaging and relied on positive reviews when potential customers considered buying from her store.2
After having success, she found counterfeiters using her product
photos, shrinking the images to fit their pendants and selling them
on online marketplaces, such as Amazon, eBay, and Wish.com.3 The
designs were blurry and sold for significantly less than what it cost
for Mindy to make.4 Filing hundreds of infringement notices,
Wish.com blocked her requests and Amazon eventually denied her
notices as well.5 By 2018, only making one-quarter of her annual
1

Oleksandra Zavertailo, Interview: The Impact of Counterfeiting on a Growing Etsy
Business, MEDIUM (Mar. 21, 2019), https://medium.com/simplybrand/interview-theimpact-of-counterfeiting-on-a-growing-etsy-business-cd51bdac268f
[https://perma.cc/29R7-DKCP].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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revenue, Mindy was in a financial hole and decided to step away
from her business.6 This struggle with online marketplaces is just
one example of how counterfeits affect rightsholders.
Counterfeits are seemingly everywhere. Once limited to street
dealers in Chinatown, these dupes are now readily available on
online marketplaces like Amazon and eBay. Because online marketplaces are often unresponsive to rightsholders’ notices and mainly
communicate automated responses,7 there have been rising tensions
between brands and these online platforms.8 Further, online marketplaces require rightsholders to find proof of counterfeit sales and to
provide the seller’s identity, which is usually information only the
marketplace can access.9 Rightsholders, feeling helpless to the process, often want to sue the platforms for their lack of activity against
counterfeits, but going against these online giants is risky.10
Other rightsholders have had their fair share of poor interactions
with online marketplaces as well. Kevin Williams and Glenn
Archer—owners of Brush Hero—went from receiving an average of
four-star reviews for their car detailing brush on Amazon to one-star
reviews due to counterfeit sales.11 The counterfeits looked like the
real product, which is made in Utah, but the returns had the “Made
in China” label.12 Williams described the situation as “the worst possible scenario,” reporting infringing sellers as many as five times.13
A similar situation occurred for Jon Fawcett’s Fuse Chicken, a
smartphone accessories company. Upon asking his account representative to restrict other sellers’ ability to list his products, Amazon
replied that the restriction was for companies who spend millions in

6

Id.
Jeff Bercovici, Small Businesses Say Amazon Has a Huge Counterfeiting Problem.
This ‘Shark Tank’ Company Is Fighting Back, INC. (Mar./Apr. 2019),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201904/jeff-bercovici/amazon-fake-copycat-knockoffproducts-small-business.html [https://perma.cc/58MT-TYBS].
8
See id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
7
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advertising.14 Without success in combating counterfeit products,
Fawcett filed a lawsuit against Amazon.15
As Mindy’s case and others demonstrate, the road to tackling
counterfeits has become tumultuous, and problems in current law
are the heart of the issue. Bringing a lawsuit against individual
sellers is costly, but it is also difficult as counterfeit sellers are often
located outside of U.S. jurisdiction.16 Additionally, current laws allow online marketplaces to generally avoid liability for the sale of
counterfeit goods. The dominant rule comes from the Second Circuit, which held that an online marketplace is not liable for contributory trademark infringement unless the platform has more than
general knowledge that the sales of counterfeit items are afoot.17
Although online marketplaces argue they take counterfeit sales
seriously by implementing anti-fraud measures,18 as a result of current law, these platforms have very little incentive to bear the responsibility of vetting counterfeit sellers and products.19 Courts do
not want to impose liability on online marketplaces because some
legitimate products are sold on the platforms, and eliminating the
sale of all resold goods would diminish competition for genuine
merchandise.20 However, many rightsholders want an adequate response to the growing problem.21
The tug of war between rightsholders and online marketplaces
has heightened, calling on legislators to take a closer look at the

14

Id.
See Fuse Chicken LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 5:17CV1538, 2018 WL 2766163
(N.D. Ohio June 8, 2018).
16
Marcella Ballard & Maria R. Sinatra, Shop Safe Act 2020: A New Tool for Brand
Owners in the Fight Against Online Counterfeits?, VENABLE (May 6, 2020),
https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2020/05/shop-safe-act-2020-a-new-tool
[https://perma.cc/Q3EE-YLPA].
17
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
18
Id. at 100.
19
See James Bikoff, Shop Safe Act: A Bill to Hold E-Commerce Sites Liable for
Counterfeit Goods Sold Online, SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP,
https://www.sgrlaw.com/ttl-articles/shop-safe-act-a-bill-to-hold-e-commerce-sites-liablefor-counterfeit-goods-sold-online [https://perma.cc/B43Y-AL4Q].
20
Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 98.
21
See generally Bercovici, supra note 7.
15
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counterfeit problem.22 In combating the problem, a bipartisan group
of House Representatives proposed a bill, the “Stopping Harmful
Offers on Platforms by Screening Against Fakes in E-Commerce
Act of 2020,” better known as the SHOP SAFE Act, amending the
Lanham Act to address contributory trademark infringement.23 The
SHOP SAFE Act was one of three bi-partisan bills introduced to
address the growth of counterfeit products on online platforms,24
signaling a significant bi-partisan concern. Due to a new Congress,
the bills were archived. Though the bill is inefficient for rightsholders and leaves very little recourse available,25 the SHOP SAFE Act
was a noteworthy proposal in addressing contributory trademark liability.
New anti-counterfeiting legislation has the potential to miss the
mark in settling the consequences of current laws. In considering the
remediation of current laws’ effects, foreign and copyright law illustrate legislative pitfalls, expressing the need for improvements to
anti-counterfeiting legislation.26 This Note explores the counterfeit
problem, the impact and drawbacks with current law, and how legislation such as the SHOP SAFE Act does not protect against all
counterfeiting.27 Part I describes the key drivers of counterfeiting
22
See infra Section I.A.2; see also Press Release, AAFA, AAFA Calls for Legislation
to Hold Online Marketplaces Accountable for Counterfeit Sales (Jan. 25, 2021), available
at https://www.aafaglobal.org/AAFA/AAFA_News/2021_Press_Releases/AAFA_calls_
for_legislation_online_marketplaces_accountable_counterfeits.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VQD6-6LRX].
23
See
H.R.
6058,
116th
Cong.
(2d
Sess.
2020),
available
at
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK].
24
See S. 3073, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019), available at https://www.congress.gov/
116/bills/s3073/BILLS-116s3073is.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ87-CENU]; see also S. 3431,
116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), available at https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/
s3431/BILLS-116s3431is.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XBM-WG9D]. Although both bills
mention online marketplaces, the SHOP SAFE Act is of significant importance because it
explicitly addresses contributory trademark liability.
25
See infra Section III.A.
26
See infra Sections II.C, II.D.
27
The SHOP SAFE Act has been archived due to a new Congress. However, because
two of the House Representatives remain in the House, it is likely this bill or a similar bill
will at least be introduced. Legislation to combat counterfeits on online marketplaces is of
interest to Congress and the proposals in this Note would apply if members of Congress
decide to introduce a bill to address contributory liability of online marketplaces under the
Lanham Act.
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and its harms, how online marketplaces play a role, and current laws
surrounding liability of online marketplaces. Part II explains the
growing complications with current law, the tension between brands
and online marketplaces resulting from current law, and comparative findings in copyright and foreign law. Part III describes the
SHOP SAFE Act’s implications for rightsholders and proposes solutions to amend the bill based on both foreign and copyright law.
I.

HOUSE OF MIRRORS: THE COUNTERFEIT PROBLEM

The counterfeit problem stems from the increase of fake items
on the Internet and the inadequacy of measures taken by online marketplaces. Thus, the problem leads to a dangerous game of whacka-mole with hardly any end in sight. To understand how serious the
problem is, one must understand the key background information
surrounding counterfeits, online marketplaces, and current laws.
Section I.A provides an overview of counterfeiting and online marketplaces, including defining what counterfeiting is and its key drivers. Section I.A also explains how counterfeiting contributes to
health and safety concerns, financial and reputational harm, diminishment of innovation and investments, and organized crime. Section I.B presents an overview of the purpose of the Lanham Act,
which governs trademark law, and details direct trademark infringement and contributory trademark liability. Lastly, Section I.C explains current domestic laws surrounding contributory trademark liability of online marketplaces, focusing on the Second Circuit’s decision, which has a significant impact on liability of online marketplaces.
A. How Online Platforms Enable Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting is the use of a mark that is identical to a registered
mark,28 and involves “the manufacturing or distribution of goods
under someone else’s name, and without their permission.”29 Counterfeit goods are typically of low quality30 and defraud purchasers
28

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
What is Counterfeiting?, INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COAL., https://www.iacc.org/
resources/about/what-is-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/ZPF2-JCE2].
30
See id.
29
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who pay for the brand name’s standard.31 They often come from
foreign markets; for example, the U.S. has cracked down on China
for the influx of counterfeit goods coming into the country.32 A typical example of a counterfeit is a fake Louis Vuitton bag sold as the
real thing.33 However, many counterfeit products produced include
refrigerator testing instruments,34 unsafe cribs,35 and bicycles.36 Although counterfeiting is a federal and state crime,37 counterfeit goods
have become a profitable activity due to the rise of the Internet and
online shopping.38 While the expansion of the Internet has led to the

31

United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990).
Alan Rappeport, U.S. Cracks Down on Counterfeits in a Warning Shot to China, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/us/politics/us-cracks-downon-counterfeits-in-a-warning-shot-to-china.html [https://perma.cc/W8QX-6NUJ].
33
See generally Trace William Cowen, Louis Vuitton Busts Up Massive Fake Bags
Operation in China, COMPLEX (Sept. 03, 2020), https://www.complex.com/style/
2020/09/louis-vuitton-busts-fake-bags-operation-in-china [https://perma.cc/WL46-7S5L].
34
See Product Counterfeiting: How Fakes Are Undermining U.S. Jobs, Innovation, and
Consumer Safety: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the
H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 109th Cong. 24 (June 25, 2005) (testimony of David S.
Pearl, II, Executive Vice President, Uniweld Products, Inc.), available at
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=469799 [https://perma.cc/6FMK-LPES] [hereinafter
Product Counterfeiting].
35
See Buyer Beware: Fake and Unsafe Products on Online Marketplaces: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Com. of the Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th
Cong. 5 (Mar. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Buyer Beware] (statement of Lori Wallach, Director,
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch), available at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20200304/110634/HHRG-116-IF17-Wstate-WallachL-20200304.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DHA3-NB3P].
36
See id. at 2 (statement of Andrew Love, Head of Brand Security/Investigations/Global
Enforcement, Specialized Bicycles), available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/03.04.30%20Written%20Testimo
ny_Love.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7RZ-5XA4]).
37
United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating “Congress enacted
section 2320 in response to an increasing tide of commercial trademark counterfeiting and
wished to impose stiff criminal penalties upon those whose intentional acts were previously
subject only to civil sanctions under the Lanham Act.”); What is Counterfeiting?, supra
note 29.
38
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT AND
PIRATED GOODS 8, 10 (2020), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/20_0124_plcy_counterfeit-pirated-goods-report_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BQ69-6UGJ]. Approximately “$1.7 trillion and $4.5 trillion a year” is
attributed to domestic and international sales of counterfeit and pirated goods. LIBR. OF
CONG., U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS—LANDSCAPE REVIEW OF
EXISTING/EMERGING
RESEARCH
(2020),
available
at
32
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creation of many websites such as Amazon and eBay, the consequences include the ease in which counterfeiters prey on consumers
by allowing imitations to blend in with legitimate businesses.39
1. Key Drivers of Online Counterfeiting
The counterfeiting industry thrives for a multitude of reasons.
First, consumers desire low prices.40 Some proponents argue for
lowering costs by promoting more competition to give consumers
more choices.41 This argument is flawed. For example, high-priced
items are typically European exports subjected to duties, and the materials needed to produce these items are costly.42 Second, online
marketplaces make startup and production costs relatively attainable
for counterfeit e-commerce.43 The startup expenses are fixed and the
costs of maintaining the web business are lower than normal business operations.44 Counterfeiters can set up their “stores” with little
to no specialized technological skills or sophistication, and there is
no need to pay for retail space or hire in-person employees.45 Online
marketplaces also allow counterfeiters to easily continue their business considering once the platform shuts down their storefronts, they
can quickly and easily set up new stores.46
Third, counterfeiters enhance profitability by keeping production costs low, most commonly by stealing product secrets.47 For
example, employees may sell trade secrets to a third-party, who will

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO-Counterfeit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M695-MMUU].
39
See Buyer Beware, supra note 35, at 7 (statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch).
40
See What is Counterfeiting?, supra note 29.
41
See Buyer Beware, supra note 35, at 9 (statement of David Friedman, Vice President,
Advocacy Consumer Reports), available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF17/20200304/110634/HHRG-116-IF17-Wstate-FriedmanD-20200304.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/HG6J-LPK4].
42
See Josh Partner, The High Price of Fashion, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 3, 2006),
https://nymag.com/fashion/06/spring/15735/index1.html [https://perma.cc/3ERT-XU66].
43
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12. Production costs are low,
transactions are convenient, and there is “an air of legitimacy.” Id. at 8.
44
See id. at 12.
45
See id.
46
See Ballard & Sinatra, supra note 16.
47
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12.
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then create the counterfeit goods from that information.48 In other
cases, employees will sell unreleased products.49 Counterfeiters will
also use intermediaries to steal products or technology, which “reduces the traceability to the counterfeiter.”50 Additionally, counterfeiters reduce production costs by manufacturing the goods in foreign markets, where producing the good is cheaper due to unsafe
working conditions and low quality materials.51 This method also
lowers the chance of detecting the counterfeiter and minimizes legal
liability.52
Fourth, counterfeiters enjoy lower marketing costs.53 Because of
the Internet’s anonymity, they can easily retarget and remarket to
consumers through advertising using legitimate images and descriptions.54 This use of the Internet confuses consumers into thinking
they are purchasing the real product.55 For example, by using
hashtags on social media, users can search, unknowingly find, and
purchase counterfeit products comingled with legitimate products,
making it difficult for users to differentiate.56
Lastly, distribution costs are lower.57 Counterfeiters previously
used international air transport—because of the high volume of
products shipped, enforcement was more difficult.58 However, current trends suggest counterfeit products are sent in smaller packages
via mail or express courier operators to minimize detection and loss

48

Id.
For example, a sales representative at the Louis Vuitton Guangzhou store sold
unreleased bags to counterfeit makers at an upmarket price in order to facilitate the spread
of counterfeit bags when the real bags would be released. See Cowen, supra note 33.
50
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 12.
51
Id. at 12–13.
52
Id. at 12.
53
Id. at 13.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
Id.; see, e.g., Olivia Solon and David Ingram, Scammers Have Turned Instagram into
a Showroom for Luxury Counterfeits, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/scammers-have-turned-instagram-showroomluxury-counterfeits-n997256 [https://perma.cc/5ZNQ-DHZN].
57
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 13.
58
Id. at 14.
49
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to the counterfeiter.59 Instead of shipping by plane directly to consumers, counterfeiters may send products to third-parties—also
known as drop shippers—through non-private express courier services.60 Counterfeiters may also use false customs declarations and
shipping manifests to conceal products, and mix counterfeit goods
with legitimate items to minimize detection.61 Because there are
lower distribution costs, counterfeiters enjoy “greater convenience
in executing transactions” and an “air of legitimacy” by listing on
popular online platforms.62
2. How Counterfeit Goods Wreak Havoc
Counterfeit products raise serious consumer health and safety
concerns as they are almost always manufactured in substandard
conditions.63 Often, the make-up of the counterfeit products is unknown and untraceable,64 and the labs that manufacture these items
have no oversight.65 For example, potential hidden toxins are in jerseys, jewelry, purses, and children’s toys.66 Further, during the
59

INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERMEDIARIES: FIGHTING
COUNTERFEITING
AND
PIRACY
IN
THE
SUPPLY
CHAIN
32
(2015),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/ICC-BASCAP-Roles-andResponsibilities-of-Intermediaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM84-2DWV].
60
Id. For example, the counterfeit product may originate in an Eastern European country
and the manufacturer may send it to the drop shipper via express mail service. See id. The
drop shipper will act as a distributor and send the product directly to the consumer. See id.
61
OFF. OF THE INTELL. PROP. ENF’T COORDINATOR EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S.
JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, SUPPORTING
INNOVATION, CREATIVITY & ENTERPRISE CHARTING A PATH AHEAD 29 (2017–2019),
available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/
spotlight/eop_ipec_jointstrategicplan_hi-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4S-HAV8]
[hereinafter JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP.]. For example, small counterfeit
products have been concealed in air-conditioning equipment or sports balls. Id.
62
See Megan Corrigan et al., US Government Cracks Down on Counterfeits in 2020,
BAKER HOSTETLER (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2020/03/18/usgovernment-cracks-down-on-counterfeits-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/GML5-A5DU].
63
See Counterfeits and Their Impact on Consumer Health and Safety: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2d Sess. 2016) (testimony of Shelley
Duggan, Global Brand Protection Program Leader, The Procter & Gamble Company),
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-27-16%20Duggan%
20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6GF-F5YL].
64
Id. at 2.
65
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 17.
66
Id. at 16–18. Counterfeit cosmetics may also contain “arsenic, mercury, aluminum, or
lead.” Id. at 18.
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coronavirus pandemic, there were fraudulent COVID-19 tests and
faulty facial coverings.67
Health and safety are not the only dangers. Counterfeits also
threaten economic harm.68 Frontier Economics, an economics consultancy, conducted a study finding this “underground economy”
creates a serious burden on the global economy.69 The study explained counterfeits deprive governmental revenues of public services, places burdens on taxpayers, and contributes to unemployment.70 In 2013, approximately 2 to 2.6 million jobs were lost globally due to counterfeit goods, with job displacement expected to
double by 2022.71
Counterfeits also hurt the value of legitimate brands, leading to
diminished innovation and a lack of investment in the creation of
innovative products.72 For example, when rightsholders cannot receive a price premium for their goods, they are less likely to invest
in creating products.73 Mindy’s story74 demonstrates how inventors
are less likely to invent as they cannot produce products at counterfeit prices.75 Additionally, smaller businesses often lack the expertise or resources to find and police the fakes, especially in global
markets.76 Small companies particularly suffer because they cannot
invest in continuous monitoring, performing test buys, and sending
takedown notices like larger corporations.77
67

See Amy Newhouse, COVID-19 and Counterfeiting Go Hand-in-Hand, THE HILL
(July 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/509230-covid-19-andcounterfeiting-go-hand-in-hand [https://perma.cc/23BQ-URLD].
68
See id.
69
FRONTIER ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 5
(2016),
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-Frontierreport-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FYV-9ERM].
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See supra Introduction.
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2007),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-may-22-fi-smallchina22story.html [https://perma.cc/A9SG-N6D5]; Product Counterfeiting, supra note 34, at 3
(statement of Hon. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. On Com., Trade, and Consumer
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Moreover, criminal organizations are notable perpetrators of
selling counterfeit goods on online marketplaces.78 These organizations may use the revenue from counterfeit sales for other criminal
activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.79 In distributing counterfeit products, these organizations rely
on manipulating trade routes, usually passing through jurisdictions
with little risk of intellectual property enforcement actions.80 Additionally, counterfeiters infiltrate private supply chains of legitimate
companies, aiding the unknowing sale of fraudulent products to consumers, industries, and governments.81 For example, an INTERPOL
supported operation found fraudulent medicines in private supply
chains donated to Ugandan and Kenyan governments for hospital
use.82
Counterfeit listings also pose serious reputational harm to legitimate businesses, especially on social media.83 Social media algorithms may trick consumers into thinking a counterfeit item is genuine.84 For example, a consumer may search for a certain product
online. Later the user may see an advertisement on a social media
site for the exact product they were seeking. However, instead of a
legitimate brand, the item is a counterfeit and the consumer may
then unknowingly purchase it. When consumers receive fake products and are disappointed in the quality, they will direct their frustrations to the authentic brand owner.85 As a result, customers may
spread bad word of mouth reviews or leave negative comments

78

JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 61, at 42.
Id.
80
Id. at 28.
81
Id. at 42.
82
East African Countries Crack Down on Counterfeiters in INTERPOL/IMPACTSupported
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II,
INTERPOL
(Oct.
2,
2009),
https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2009/East-African-countries-crackdown-on-counterfeiters-in-INTERPOL-IMPACT-supported-Operation-Mamba-II
[https://perma.cc/BH6G-9C3X].
83
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORGANIZATION, STUDY ON APPROACHES TO ONLINE
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENTS 4–5 (2017), available at https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_12/wipo_ace_12_9_rev_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SA3-YRRM].
84
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online,86 similar to what happened with Brush Hero and Fuse
Chicken.87
B. Online Platform Liability for Counterfeits
The Lanham Act governs trademark protections in the U.S. and
defines trademarks as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.”88 One of its original purposes was to prevent
fraud and deception by use of reproductions, copies, or counterfeits
of registered marks in commerce.89 It also sought to provide rights
and remedies respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition.90 The Lanham Act has defined counterfeit as, “a spurious
mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable
from, a registered mark.”91 To prove direct infringement for counterfeit trademarks under § 1114 of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant used the mark in commerce without consent
and that such use is likely to cause confusion.92 Courts will typically
apply these elements in a two-prong test to see if the statute protects
the mark and whether it causes confusion to a consumer.93
Conversely, contributory trademark infringement derives from
the common law of torts.94 A contributory trademark infringement
claim can reach beyond those who mislabel goods with the mark of
another to hold additional parties accountable.95 In other words,
even if a party does not directly participate in the infringement, they
may nevertheless be responsible for another party’s infringing activities.96 In 1982, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test for

86
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See supra Introduction.
88
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
89
H.R. 1654, 79th Cong. 427, 444 (1946). The full bill was titled “An Act to provide
for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes.” Id.
90
Id.
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15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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15 U.S.C. § 1114.
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See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010).
94
Id. at 103–04 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 930 (2005)).
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Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982).
96
Id.
87
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contributory trademark infringement,97 commonly known as the Inwood test. To satisfy the test, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally induced another to infringe on a trademark or
that the defendant continued to supply products to one whom they
know or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.98 Although this test originally applied to manufacturers or distributors for contributory liability, the Second Circuit extended the
test to apply to cases involving online marketplaces.99
For contributory trademark infringement claims, plaintiffs may
argue that the defendant engaged in willful blindness to satisfy the
knowledge requirement.100 Willful blindness is when a defendant
knew it may be selling infringing goods, but intentionally failed to
investigate.101 However, courts reason that if an online marketplace
intentionally shielded itself from discovering infringing sellers or
listings, willful blindness may be sufficient to trigger Inwood’s
knowledge standard.102
Some proponents suggest bringing counterfeit suits under copyright law, arguing the use of unauthorized photographs may provide
rightsholders an alternative avenue.103 However, this argument does
not address the inherent injustice in using a legitimate brand’s name
to sell counterfeit goods. Alternatively, there may be an argument
that injured parties should bring patent claims for counterfeit goods.
However, “patent infringement does not cause the kind of unquantifiable harm to goodwill or reputation that the Lanham Act is intended to address.”104 Thus, if brands want to protect their name
from counterfeiting, trademark law is a good option.
97

See id. at 854.
Id.
99
Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 104–106.
100
See id. at 109.
101
Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Ultimate One Distrib. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 3d 137, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x
26, 31 (2d Cir. 2013)).
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Judiciary, 114th Cong. 6 (2019) (statement of Peter M. Brody, Partner, Ropes & Gray
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C. The Difficulty in Holding Online Marketplaces Liable Under
Current Law
1. The Tiffany v. eBay Ruling
In 2010, the Second Circuit changed the landscape regarding
trademark liability of online marketplaces.105 Tiffany, the plaintiff,
put forth three main arguments for trademark infringement: eBay
was directly liable, contributorily liable, and willfully blind.106 The
court decided that online marketplaces are not liable for direct trademark infringement, ruling that online marketplaces can use a brand’s
mark to describe authentic products.107 The court also held that Inwood’s knowledge requirement determines whether an online marketplace can be held liable for contributory trademark liability.108
Lastly, the court addressed willful blindness. The court noted that if
an online marketplace did not ignore information regarding counterfeit sales, they are not willfully blind and such “knowledge is insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood.”109
In Tiffany, the luxury jewelry maker Tiffany—commonly
known as Tiffany & Co.—conducted two surveys known as “Buying Programs.”110 As a part of these programs, Tiffany bought various items on eBay to determine how many were authentic and counterfeit.111 In the first survey, Tiffany found 73.1 percent were counterfeit and in the second survey 75.5 percent were counterfeit.112 At
the time, eBay had its VeRO program which would remove listings
of reported goods within twenty-four hours of receiving a “Notice
Of Claimed Infringement form or NOCI form.”113 If the auction was
still in progress, eBay would remove the listing and inform the
seller.114 If the auction already ended, eBay would cancel the
105

See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d 93.
Id. at 101, 103, 110; Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 49, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay
Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv).
107
Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 103.
108
See id. at 106.
109
See id. at 110.
110
Id. at 97.
111
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112
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113
Id. at 99.
114
Id.
106
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transaction or reimburse the buyer.115 For Tiffany, eBay removed
“seventy to eighty percent of counterfeit listings within twelve hours
of notification.”116 eBay also allowed Tiffany, and other rightsholders, to create buyer beware pages to inform users.117 By late 2006,
eBay implemented more anti-counterfeit measures by delaying listings including brand names so rightsholders could review them.118
a) Direct Trademark Liability
While attempting to restrict counterfeit listings, eBay also
sought to promote the sale of luxury goods by advertising the availability of Tiffany products on its website and by purchasing sponsored-link advertisements on various search engines.119 Tiffany argued eBay directly infringed its mark in two ways: by using the
mark on eBay’s website and purchasing sponsored links using the
mark on search engines.120 Tiffany also argued eBay and its sellers
were jointly and severally liable.121 On appeal, the Second Circuit
applied the two-prong test to determine direct trademark liability:
(1) “whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled to protection”; and (2)
“whether the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s
goods.”122
The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that eBay’s use
of Tiffany’s trademark was lawful because eBay used that mark to
describe authentic Tiffany jewelry, citing the nominative fair use
defense.123 This defense provides that a defendant can use the plaintiff’s mark to identify the plaintiff’s goods as long as it does not
create a likelihood of confusion about the source or sponsorship.124
The court stated that reducing or eliminating the sale of second-hand
Tiffany goods would diminish competition, thus benefitting
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 102.
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Id.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 102.
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Tiffany.125 The court also noted that the result would be a loss of
revenue to eBay.126 Tiffany argued that even though eBay may have
used the mark to describe genuine Tiffany products, eBay knew or
should have known there was a notable counterfeit problem.127 The
Second Circuit decided this argument did not apply to direct trademark infringement but instead applied to whether eBay could be
held liable for contributory trademark infringement.128 The court
also reasoned eBay could not guarantee the genuineness of all Tiffany products on its website.129
b) Contributory Trademark Liability
On the issue of contributory trademark infringement, Tiffany argued again that eBay knew, or at least had reason to know, counterfeit Tiffany goods were sold on the platform because of the NOCI
forms, the demand letters, and the buying programs’ results Tiffany
sent to eBay.130 The Second Circuit applied Inwood’s knowledge
requirement for contributory trademark liability and agreed with the
lower court’s decision that this generalized knowledge was insufficient to satisfy the Inwood test.131 In applying Inwood, the court concluded there must be more than general knowledge or a reason to
know counterfeit goods were sold to hold the online marketplace
liable for contributory trademark infringement.132 Specifically, the
Second Circuit agreed with the District Court that Tiffany would
need to show “eBay knew or had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement.”133 Therefore, the court ruled eBay
was not contributorily liable for trademark infringement.134
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c) Willful Blindness
On the willful blindness issue, the Second Circuit agreed with
the District Court that if eBay knew of the counterfeits and intentionally shielded itself from discovering the listings and the sellers
behind the listings, this inaction may have satisfied Inwood’s
knowledge requirement.135 However, despite eBay having general
knowledge that counterfeit Tiffany products were sold, the court
ruled this knowledge was insufficient to trigger Inwood.136 The court
reasoned eBay did not ignore the information about counterfeit
products on its website as eBay removed many of the reported listings.137
2. Life After Tiffany: How Courts Keep This Ruling Alive
Other courts agree that Tiffany is the standard for contributory
trademark liability of online marketplaces, yet they often distinguish
cases from Tiffany.138 In the Eleventh Circuit, the court ruled in favor of the luxury brand retailer, Luxottica, by upholding the jury’s
verdict that defendant, Airport Mini Mall, was liable for contributory trademark infringement.139 The court distinguished itself from
Tiffany by ruling there was a landlord-tenant relationship.140 While
the defendant served as the Mall’s landlord, law enforcement raided
the shopping center and confiscated counterfeit Luxottica products
three times.141 Reasoning that a landlord-tenant relationship is different from Tiffany’s relationship with eBay, the defendants did not
need Luxottica’s help in identifying the subtenants who were infringing on Luxottica’s mark.142

135
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Id. at 110.
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Id. at 99, 110.
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Although this Note focuses on contributory trademark liability, online marketplaces
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Similarly, in a California case, Tre Milano v. Amazon, Tiffany
still prevailed.143 The court ruled that Tre Milano failed to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on direct and contributory infringement claims against Amazon because the online marketplace removed the infringing listings and was not willfully blind.144 In another case, a Southern District of New York court ruled in favor of
Chanel, a luxury retailer, by holding The RealReal, a luxury consignment, liable for direct trademark infringement of counterfeit
Chanel items.145 The court distinguished this case from Tiffany because unlike eBay, The RealReal has the sole responsibility of selling the goods.146 In this case, the ruling suggests luxury consigners
do not function as online marketplaces, thus, Tiffany and the counterfeit problem lives on.
II. MORE COUNTERFEITS, MORE PROBLEMS: THE PROBLEM WITH ANTICOUNTERFEITING LEGISLATION

Owners of legitimate trademarks are plagued by the multitude
of counterfeit goods available on the Internet,147 and given that
online counterfeiters can charge far less than their originals, brands
have very little recourse available. While current law suggests a
need for legislative intervention, proposed legislation does not alleviate the significant burdens on rightsholders.148 Section II.A describes the problem with the Tiffany ruling and Section II.B details
the inadequacy of online marketplaces’ internal regulating systems.
Although this Note discusses the distorted tango between contributory trademark infringement, online marketplaces, and counterfeits,
similar negative impacts arise in copyright law. Thus, Section II.C
examines the results and legal implications of copyright law as compared to trademark law. Section II.D introduces French and Italian
law to highlight the deficiencies in holding online marketplaces liable in the U.S. Lastly, Section II.E introduces the SHOP SAFE Act.
143

Tre Milano, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., No. B234753, 2012 WL 3594380, at *14
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012).
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A. The Negative Impacts of Tiffany
In Tiffany, there were concerns about who should be responsible
for finding counterfeits.149 Tiffany argued if eBay were not held liable, the ruling would require rightsholders to police online marketplaces “24 hours a day, and 365 days a year,” and many rightsholders would be unable to bear this burden.150 Rightsholders have, in
fact, encountered several hurdles after the Tiffany ruling. In holding
online sellers accountable, existing laws tend to shield foreign counterfeiters from liability because they are often outside of U.S. jurisdiction.151 Thus, rightsholders often turn to either continuously taking down listings or suing for trademark infringement.152 Ultimately, the burden is on rightsholders to police and report infringement,153 creating financial and time-consuming costs.
The time-consuming burdens on rightsholders are significant.
The Tiffany decision, arguably, shifted the burden away from the ecommerce platform and placed it onto the rightsholder to find and
police counterfeits,154 engaging in a continuous game of whack-amole.155 For example, Wish.com blocked infringement requests by
legitimate owners against sellers, and Amazon, too, has denied legitimate infringement claims.156 Additionally, when Mindy reached
out to third-party sellers, she never received a response.157 As a result, counterfeits destroy products’ quality, making it impossible for
small businesses to address.158
There are also incredible financial burdens as a result of current
law. A common way to show specific instances of infringement is

149
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through test buys, where a seller buys a product to test the quality.159
However, this action can cost a significant amount of money if there
are multiple listings and sellers, especially for small businesses.160
Tiffany alone spent $14 million in anti-counterfeiting efforts.161 As
a result of these financial burdens, some brands are turning to blockchain technology to certify the authenticity of their products.162
Brands have even instituted intellectual property task forces in their
fight against counterfeiters, involving collaboration between major
online marketplaces and well-known brands.163 Changes should be
made as many of these efforts could prove to be difficult, or even
impossible, for small businesses.
Online marketplaces are feeling the effects of the counterfeit
problem. For instance, in 2019, Nike pulled its products from Amazon after its short stint as a wholesaler to combat Nike fakes on the
platform.164 The successful activewear company was unable to
maintain control because when Amazon removed counterfeit listings, more would appear under a different name.165 Brands, such as
Nike, attempt these preventative measures due to the Tiffany ruling,
taking an “if you can’t beat them, join them” approach.166 As a
159
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result, some online marketplaces are increasing their anti-counterfeiting efforts.167
B. Internal Regulating Systems Failure to Mitigate the Counterfeit
Problem
The counterfeit problem is akin to a tale of David and Goliath.
Online marketplaces claim because they are not selling the counterfeit goods and are merely providing consumers access to the goods,
they are not responsible for false representations on their platforms.168 However, they continue to facilitate the distribution of
counterfeit products. For example, after Amazon heavily recruited
Chinese sellers, its China team reported concerns of an increase in
counterfeits, fraud, and unsafe products on its platform.169 Listing
on well-known online marketplaces, such as Amazon, could deceive
consumers as it gives these goods a presumption of legitimacy.170
Amazon also provides low cost means for counterfeiters to avoid
research and development costs, and takes care of shipping logistics
for third-party sellers.171 Additionally, counterfeiters may upload
pictures of the real product, use fake reviews, and include other misleading information intended to deceive consumers.172 In Brush
Hero’s case,173 Kevin opted for his products to be commingled in
Amazon’s fulfillment centers.174 Comingling means if an item is
listed as the same product but is a counterfeit from a different seller
located in a warehouse closer to the customer, Amazon may unknowingly send the counterfeit item so the consumer can receive the
product faster.175
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To combat the counterfeit problem, Amazon launched programs, such as Project Zero and its brand registry. Project Zero is an
anti-counterfeiting system providing three tools: automated protections, self-service counterfeit removal, and product serialization.176
Its brand registry is an enrollment program used to help rightsholders protect their brand.177 The downfall of these programs is that
none of their efforts seem to be stopping the sale of counterfeits,
leaving the burden to find the dupes on the rightsholder.178 Amazon
even engaged in joint lawsuits with brands against its users who are
selling fake items.179 As a response to increasing pressure to resolve
its counterfeit problem, the platform established a Counterfeit
Crimes Unit to pursue civil litigation and criminal prosecution
against counterfeiters, collaborate with brands in investigations, and
help law enforcement.180 Although Amazon’s anti-counterfeiting effort is a significant improvement, the effort does not completely
solve the problem; it fails to require sellers to use accurate and
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authorized images, transparent processes to prevent repeat offenders, and comprehensive takedown policies.181
In addition to Amazon’s efforts, anti-counterfeiting programs on
online marketplaces have been inadequate for small businesses.
Most marketplaces have not taken the same measures as Amazon,
as the majority only provide policies against counterfeits on their
websites.182 Although eBay has its VeRO program, which allows
rightsholders to report eBay listings for infringement,183 the platform nevertheless maintains a self-policing model.184 On other marketplaces such as Walmart, brand owners must separately request
information from the seller after submitting their infringement report.185 Further, small businesses do not have access to some of the
anti-counterfeiting measures offered by online marketplaces. For instance, eBay launched its Authenticity Guarantee program in 2020,
which only provided post-sale authentication for watches valued
over $2,000 and sneakers valued over $100.186 Small businesses,
such as MinMac, Brush Hero, and Fuse Chicken,187 would be unable

181
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and Brand Protection Policy, WISH.COM, https://merchant.wish.com/intellectualproperty#ip-counterfeit [https://perma.cc/SR9C-VPZA].
183
Verified Rights Owner Program, EBAY, https://pages.ebay.com/seller-center/listingand-marketing/verified-rights-owner-program.html [https://perma.cc/2SKJ-TZL9].
184
Scott Pilutik, eBay’s Secondary Trademark Liability Problem and Its VeRO Program,
16 NYSBA BRIGHT IDEAS 1, 7 (Spring/Summer 2007), available at https://nysba.org/
NYSBA/Publications/Section%20Publications/Intellectual/PastIssues/SpringSummer200
7Vol16No1/SpringSummer2007Vol16No1Assets/IPNewsSprSum07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JXV-5RLM].
185
See He et al., supra note 178.
186
See eBay News Team, eBay To Authenticate Sneakers $100+ in U.S., EBAY (Oct. 12,
2020), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/ebay-to-authenticate-sneakers-100-in-u-s
[https://perma.cc/4AUL-9LZ8]; see also Press Release, eBay, eBay Launches
Authentication On All Watches Sold for $2,000 or More in the US with New Service,
“Authenticity Guarantee” (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.ebayinc.com/stories/news/ebaylaunches-authentication-on-all-watches-sold-for-2-000-or-more-in-the-us-with-newservice-authenticity-guarantee/ [https://perma.cc/7EAV-Y3Q6].
187
Supra Introduction.
182
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to apply not only because they do not sell sneakers or watches, but
also because their products do not meet the price threshold.188
Therefore, although these programs provide some aid, many businesses remain out of luck.
C. Similar Conflicts in Copyright Law
Some proponents believe trademark law should mirror the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).189 Trademark legislation
to address the counterfeit problem has been an important point of
discussion.190 Even though there are similarities between copyright
and trademark law, this Note rejects the proposal that contributory
trademark liability should mirror the DMCA. However, in highlighting the similarities in copyright legislation, this Section will demonstrate why copyright law should merely inspire trademark law instead of implementing a parallel imitation.
In the Committee Report for the DMCA, Senator Patrick Leahy
remarked that there must be “copyright laws [to] protect the intellectual property rights of creative works available online in ways
that promote the use of the Internet, both by content providers and
users.”191 Thus the DMCA’s purpose was to facilitate development
in the digital age192 and tackle the controversial issue of secondary
liability, such as contributory infringement.193 Section 512 of the
188

See
generally
MinMac
Printable
Wall
Decor,
ETSY,
https://www.etsy.com/shop/MinMac [https://perma.cc/W2JH-QWRL]; see also generally
Shop, BRUSH HERO, https://brushhero.com/collections/all [https://perma.cc/N88D-BEZB];
FUSE CHICKEN, https://www.fusechicken.com [https://perma.cc/27CM-2EKM]. Mindy
sold her necklaces for approximately $15 to $18. Fuse Chicken products cost
approximately $20 to $40. Brush Hero’s detailing brush costs approximately $50.
189
Lehrer, supra note 154, at 399; Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from
the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v.
Ebay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 940 (2005).
190
See Sunderji, supra note 189, at 940; see also generally INTA Steps Up Efforts to
Combat Counterfeits, New Laws Under Consideration, INTA (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.inta.org/inta-steps-up-efforts-to-combat-counterfeits-new-laws-underconsideration/ [https://perma.cc/VL4L-792R]; AAFA, supra note 22.
191
S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 65 (1998), available at https://www.congress.gov/
105/crpt/srpt190/CRPT-105srpt190.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GPC-5X8V].
192
Id. at 1–2.
193
Id. at 40; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17 21–22 (2020), available
at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9N4P-U99N] [hereinafter SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17] (stating that
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DMCA provides online service providers (“OSPs”)194 four safe harbors when they work with copyright owners to take down infringing
content.195 OSPs must “adopt and reasonably implement” a policy
for the termination of “subscribers and account holders . . . who are
repeat infringers.”196 However, as currently interpreted, an unwritten policy is in compliance with this requirement.197 OSPs must also
“maintain a ‘notice-and-takedown’ process whereby the OSP responds expeditiously to remove or disable access” to the infringing
material.198 In creating this process, Congress intended to provide
incentives for OSPs and copyright owners to “address online infringement cooperatively and efficiently” while encouraging the Internet’s development.199
In 2020, the Copyright Office reported its concerns about the
Section 512 safe harbors and concluded the balance intended by
Congress was askew.200 The Copyright Office also concluded significant problems remain despite technological advancements, millions of takedown notices, the ineffectiveness of these notices, and
the scope of online copyright infringement.201 At the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property on Section 512 of the
DMCA, Chairman Tillis remarked the notice-and-takedown system
allowed piracy to run rampant and has been ineffective, calling for
a new system.202
because OSPs provide the means rather than the content, OSPs are more likely to have
secondary liability claims against them).
194
S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 40. The Copyright Office recognizes that online service
providers and internet service providers are used interchangeably, but in their report
differentiates. Id. The Office refers to ISPs as mere conduit service providers under section
512(a) and uses OSPs to refer to all online service providers, including mere conduits. Id.
Essentially, an ISP provides web access whereas an OSP can be a website, email services,
or network services. Id.
195
Id. at 8.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 3.
198
Id. at 9.
199
Id.
200
See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 197.
201
Id.
202
Committee on the Judiciary, Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working
in the 21st Century?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 29:38, 30:48–32:15 (June 2, 2020) (statement of Thom Tillis,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
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Proponents suggest Congress enact legislation parallel to the
DMCA safe harbor provision because there are similar justifications, such as encouraging the Internet’s development, creating incentives for cooperation between rightsholders and online entities,
and offering guidance for infringement liability.203 However, although Section 512 has fairly specific eligibility requirements,204 it
is still ineffective in its takedown process, repeat infringer policy,
and its knowledge requirements highlighted below.205 Thus, legislation addressing contributory liability of online marketplaces should
be inspired by the DMCA but should also go farther.
1. The DMCA’s Takedown Process
The DMCA mandates a copyright owner include the following
in their takedown notice: the signature of the complaining party, the
identification of the copyrighted work and infringing material, the
complaining party’s contact information, and statements that the
complaining party is acting in good faith, the notice’s information is
accurate, and the party has authorization to act.206 The Copyright
Office suggested a regulatory process regarding the minimum notice
standards for takedown notices to protect the statute against changing communication methods.207 The Copyright Office also stated
rightsholders found the notice-and-takedown system burdensome,
highlighting the financial and time-consuming demands.208 As there
is no exact timeframe for notice-and-takedowns,209 the Copyright
Office noted it supports either a flexible statutory standard or a regulatory framework to complement existing judicial time ranges.210
Similar to the conclusion the Copyright Office draws, the lack of a
regulatory framework—or even specific requirements for its
takedown notice—presents a significant challenge for rightsholders

https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/is-the-dmcas-notice-and-takedown-systemworking-in-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/6NAF-J6ML].
203
See Sunderji, supra note 189, at 940–41.
204
See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 8 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)–(d)).
205
See infra Section II.C.1, Section II.C.2, Section II.C.3.
206
See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 25–26.
207
See id. at 5.
208
Id. at 137.
209
See id. at 160.
210
Id. at 162.
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to have counterfeit goods removed by online marketplaces. However, legislation needs to go beyond what the DMCA provides to
ensure a more efficient process.
2. The DMCA’s Repeat Infringer Policy
Additionally, the Copyright Office stated having a clear, documented, and public repeat infringer policy is an appropriate minimum requirement and deterrent to infringement than unwritten policies.211 Current legislation does not specify a clear repeat infringer
policy, nor does it require online platforms to make termination procedures publicly available.212 Comparatively to the suggestions in
the DMCA report, online marketplaces may employ unwritten policies to meet minimum requirements. This possibility would create
even more burdens for rightsholders. However, there must be more
than minimum requirements and deterrence, such as what the Copyright Office suggests, to address rightsholders’ concerns.
3. The DMCA and Tiffany’s Knowledge Requirements
Lastly, the Copyright Office looked into the tension between actual knowledge and red flag knowledge.213 Respectively, Section
512 of the DMCA requires OSPs lack actual knowledge of infringing material and lack awareness of facts or circumstances where infringing material is apparent.214 The Copyright Office suggested
Congress clarify these two requirements, where such knowledge requirements would benefit from a reasonableness standard.215 The report also suggested Congress clarify the intended scope of willful
blindness.216 Similar to willful blindness in Tiffany, OSPs that intentionally blind itself from knowledge of infringing activity satisfy the
actual knowledge requirement and loses its safe harbor.217
211

Id. at 3.
The SHOP SAFE Act only specifies that the platform must terminate sellers that have
sold counterfeits on more than three instances. See H.R. 6058, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020),
available at https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6058/BILLS-116hr6058ih.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9E8U-UQNK].
213
See SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17, supra note 193, at 3.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 4.
217
Id.
212
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Legislation regarding contributory liability for online marketplaces should address Tiffany’s knowledge requirement. Courts are
not new to interpreting existing law and adding heightened standards into statutes when they are not explicitly addressed. For example, Congress codified the willful infringement standard in 35
U.S.C. § 298 when it enacted the 2012 American Invents Act
(“AIA”).218 Courts have changed this standard over the years by first
applying a two-prong “objectively reckless” standard,219 to declining an imposition of an affirmative obligation to obtain outside
counsel,220 only later to agree the opinion of counsel may be relevant.221 The latest discussion from courts for determining willfulness is changing the standard from a question of law to de novo review.222 If new legislation does not address the Tiffany knowledge
standard, there is a chance courts may react similarly for contributory trademark liability by determining a knowledge requirement is
necessary. As a result, rightsholders would be unable to meet the
heightened standards.
4. Copyright Reform in 2021
Although anti-counterfeiting reform is of significant importance, it should not track some future copyright reform proposals. The pandemic relief and government spending bill (the “Omnibus Bill”) 223 established a quasi-judicial tribunal with three “Copyright Claims Officers.”224 The law empowers the Board to hear
copyright infringement claims, misrepresentation of takedown notices, and related counterclaims and defenses for cases not
218

Bryan J. Cannon, The Travesty of Patent Opinion Use: Advancing the AIA to Fix the
Misguided Patent Infringement Enhanced Damages Framework, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV.
439, 445, 454 n.129 (2015) (“This was not only a holding of In re Seagate, it was recently
codified in the America Invents Act.”).
219
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
220
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
221
Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
222
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 841 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923.
223
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, H.R. 113, 116th Cong. (2020), available at
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-116HR133SA-RCP116-68.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z2L-3HXQ].
224
Id. at Div. Q § 212, 78–79, 88. Also known as the CASE Act. Id.
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exceeding $30,000 in the aggregate.225 Critics are concerned this
new law will provide larger companies the opportunity to pursue
damages against Internet users.226 There is also a concern the law
facilitates abuse by “copyright trolls,” may silence free speech, and
may be ineffective because of the opt-out option.227
Copyright law is also experiencing reform on the DMCA front.
U.S. Senator Thom Tillis released a discussion draft for modernizing copyright law, also known as the Digital Copyright Act of
2021.228 The draft includes revisions to the safe harbor provisions,
such as establishing best practices for OSPs, lowering the specificity
of the knowledge requirements, and replacing the notice and
takedown system with a notice-and-stay-down system.229
Responding to arguments calling for trademark reform to mimic
copyright reform, the results may be alarming. The concern the Omnibus Bill may facilitate abuse by “copyright trolls”230 is already
present on online marketplaces. By taking advantage of online marketplaces’ anti-counterfeiting systems, counterfeiters report legitimate listings and take over the market share once the online marketplace deactivates the legitimate account.231 Therefore, to address
such concerns, a parallel amendment to trademark liability would
not resolve the problem.
Additionally, anti-counterfeiting reform should not track copyright reform, specifically Senator Tillis’ discussion draft requiring
225

Id. at 84–85, 93–94. With respect to registered works, parties may receive up to
$15,000 in damages. See id at 93. With respect to unregistered works, parties may receive
up to $15,000 in damages. See id at 94.
226
Jaci L. Overmann & Emily O. Douglass, Intell. Property Measures Included in
Spending and Coronavirus Relief Omnibus Bill, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 30, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/intellectual-property-measures-included-spendingand-coronavirus-relief-omnibus-bill [https://perma.cc/294T-KMQ8].
227
Id.
228
See generally Digital Copyright Act of 2021 (Discussion Draft Dec. 18, 2020),
available at https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB6A745015C14B [https://perma.cc/7UDC-6K77].
229
Press Release, Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/
12/tillis-releases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyrightact [https://perma.cc/XQ5B-GUMN].
230
Overmann & Douglass, supra note 226, at 2.
231
See Bercovici, supra note 7, at 17–18.
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users who upload content to hold the copyright to the content.232 If
anti-counterfeiting legislation proposes users hold the trademark,
this requirement may not stop counterfeiters from claiming they are
reselling legitimate items.233 Although mimicking copyright reform
is not a step in the right direction, copyright reform should inspire
anti-counterfeiting legislation to address Tiffany and its impact on
rightsholders.
D. Foreign Law: How France and Italy Tackle the Counterfeit
Problem
Liability for online marketplaces in foreign law should serve as
inspiration for future legislation. The French Intellectual Property
Code defines counterfeit broadly: any counterfeit is an offense.234
By defining counterfeit broadly, French law suggests there is farreaching liability for online marketplaces. French law also criminalizes defendants if convicted of buying counterfeit goods, facing up
to three years in prison.235 Although this Note does not suggest criminalizing counterfeit buyers, it does propose more robust suggestions to hold online marketplaces contributorily liable because of the
counterfeit problem and Tiffany’s effect.236
French courts are not afraid to hold online marketplaces liable.
In France, LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (“LVMH”) and
eBay had a long-standing legal battle over counterfeits and

232

See Digital Copyright Act of 2021 (Discussion Draft Dec. 18, 2020), at 3.
Currently, users can resell items but there has been recent litigation surrounding
whether there is trademark dilution for the resale of legitimate products on online
marketplaces. See Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 18-CV-07548-EDL,
2019 WL 7810815, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2019) (ruling that Amazon’s motion to dismiss
is denied).
234
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, art. 335-2 (Fr.) (“Any edition of writings,
musical composition, drawing, painting or any other production, printed or engraved in
whole or in part, in defiance of the laws and regulations relating to the property of authors,
is an infringement; and any counterfeit is an offense.”); Dianna Michelle Martínez,
Fashionably Late: Why the United States Should Copy France and Italy to Reduce
Counterfeiting, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 509, 524 (2014).
235
See Sam Cocks, Note, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination of the
Booming International Trade in Counterfeit Luxury Goods and an Assessment of the
American Efforts to Curtail its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 501, 507 (2007).
236
See infra Part III.
233
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infringement.237 In 2008, a French Court ruled in favor of LVMH
and ordered eBay to pay 38.5 million euros, which is approximately
$52.1 million, to compensate LVMH for selling counterfeit and infringing products.238 A French appeals court affirmed the judgment,
but reduced the sum to 5.7 million euros.239 Even though LVMH
employs investigators to find counterfeit products, the court went in
the opposite direction of Tiffany by agreeing with the luxury brand
that responsibility for policing their platforms should fall on
eBay.240 The court noted eBay could not merely operate as an internet service provider or a computer program where buyers act independently, comparing the responsibility of an online marketplace to
the responsibility of an auction house for the goods it sells.241
In contrast to Tiffany, the French court went further by adding
restrictions for the online marketplace. These restrictions included
requiring resellers to register with the commerce and trade ministry,
provide receipts of purchase or certificates of authenticity upon request, and be subject to monitoring to ensure the sale of only legitimate goods.242 The court also suggested eBay notify consumers
whenever a listing appeared suspicious.243 The ruling confirmed the
importance of ensuring authentication and quality of products for
consumers and clarified the rules to prevent illicit selling practices,244 which the Tiffany ruling failed to do. The decision also
237

See Martinne Geller, LVMH and eBay Settle Litigation over Fake Goods, REUTERS
(July 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lvmh-ebay-settlement/lvmh-and-ebaysettle-litigation-over-fake-goods-idUSKBN0FM15G20140717 [https://perma.cc/P48GP457].
238
See id.
239
Id.
240
See Doreen Carvajal, Court Sides with LVMH over eBay, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/technology/30iht-lvmh.4.14109529.html
[https://perma.cc/44N5-58F8] (“eBay bears responsibility for filtering the system and
demanding assurances of authenticity.”).
241
See Angelo Bufalino and Christopher Moreno, Internet Merchants Owe a Greater
Duty of Care to Their European Clients - Louis Vuitton v. eBay [France] in Contrast See
Tiffany v. eBay [NY, US], THE NAT’L L. REV (Sept. 5, 2010),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/internet-merchants-owe-greater-duty-care-to-theireuropean-clients-louis-vuitton-v-ebay-fran [https://perma.cc/2UVX-RAXE].
242
See id.
243
See id.
244
See Press Release, LVMH, LVMH/eBay—The Paris Court of Appeal Confirms
eBay’s Liability (Sept. 3, 2010), available at https://www.lvmh.com/news-
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prohibited eBay from engaging in future direct or indirect violations
of selective distribution245 and forbade the online marketplace from
selling LVMH brand perfumes in the future.246 In 2012, an appeals
court affirmed the judgment but limited the application to French
and British courts.247 Both companies have settled their case by implementing cooperative measures.248
In a different case, a French court also held eBay liable for infringement in the sale of counterfeit Hermès bags, echoing a decision which eliminated a copyright infringement liability defense for
e-commerce companies.249 Contrary to the U.S. and the Tiffany ruling, the main takeaway is that France is more supportive of
rightsholders; it cracks down on counterfeiting and pushes to hold
online marketplaces accountable for facilitating counterfeiting.250
Italian law is also tough on preventing and penalizing counterfeit
activity. Italy is one country most affected by global counterfeiting,
directly after the United States and France.251 Intellectual property
is a significant part of Italy’s economy, and almost every industry
either produces or uses it.252 Trademark industries alone contribute
36.1 percent to Italy’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) and 21.5

documents/press-releases/lvmh-ebay-the-paris-court-of-appeal-confirms-ebays-liability/
[https://perma.cc/Q4QN-XPJ9].
245
See id.
246
See Jonathan Thrope, French Court Orders eBay to Pay Luxury Goods Giant $63
Million, AM. L. DAILY (July 1, 2008), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/
2008/06/french-court-or.html [https://perma.cc/5F4R-VYDH].
247
See Geller, supra note 237.
248
See id.
249
See Rick Mitchell, French Court Rules eBay Liable for Sales of Counterfeit Hermès
Bags, BLOOMBERG L. (July 27, 2010), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/frenchcourt-rules-ebay-liable-for-sales-of-counterfeit-hermes-bags
[https://perma.cc/QY7HYTF2].
250
See, e.g., Romain Dillet, French Administration Suspects Wish of Selling Counterfeit
Products, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 30, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/30/frenchadministration-suspects-wish-of-selling-counterfeit-products [https://perma.cc/M8FW6324].
251
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE IN
COUNTERFEIT
GOODS
AND
THE
ITALIAN
ECONOMY
16
(2018),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/trade-in-counterfeit-goods-and-the-italian-economyupdated-december-2018-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEX7-TY6P].
252
See id.
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percent of total employment.253 Comparatively to the response towards Tiffany, Italy responded to counterfeits increasing presence
with robust anti-counterfeiting measures. For example, the Istituto
di Centromarca per Iotta alla contraffazione (“INDICAM”) acts as
a middleman between the law and different industries, presenting
itself as an expert body on counterfeits.254 Italy also has an antitrust
authority, which previously shut down websites selling counterfeit
items.255
Italy’s code penalizes both consumers and sellers of counterfeit
goods.256 In enacting Decree-Law No. 80 of 14 May 2005, Italy has
implemented a fine up to 10,000 euro to anyone who purchases or
receives an item without vetting its origin, when the price or other
factors leads the customer to believe there has been intellectual
property infringement.257 After this decree, Italy’s Supreme Criminal Court ruled—under Articles 473 and 474 of the Criminal
Code—trademark infringement includes post-sale confusion.258
Italian courts have also held internet service providers liable if they

253

Id.
See
INDICAM,
http://www.indicam.it/wp-content/uploads/2018_INDICAM_
Company-Profile_ENG-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYZ4-ABDH] (“INDICAM works as a
connection point between industry and law, presenting itself in front of institutions,
enforcement, companies or consumers as a privileged observatory on all the topics
concerning brands.”).
255
Press Release, AGCM, Made in Italy: The Antitrust Authority, in Collaboration With
the Special Market Protection Unit of the Guardia di Finanza (Italian Tax Police) Shuts
Down 15 Websites Selling Counterfeit Products Branded Tod’s and Roger Vivier (June
17, 2013), https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2013/6/alias-2069 [https://perma.cc/
F7GX-RN66]; see also Reuters Staff, Italian Police Block 410 Websites Selling HighFashion Fakes, REUTERS (June 19, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italycounterfeit-idUSKBN0OZ14E20150619 [https://perma.cc/5LR9-7HRM ].
256
Codice Penale [C.p.] [Penal Code] art. 474 (It.), available at
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=36768
[https://perma.cc/U9ZY-2E7L];
Martínez, supra note 234 (“Article 474 of the Italian Criminal Code provides that anyone
who introduces counterfeit goods into Italy shall be punished with imprisonment for one
to four years, and face a fine ranging from 3,500 to 35,000 euro.”).
257
Martínez, supra note 234, at 528 (citing Decreto legge 14 maggio 2005, n. 80/05, art.
1(7), G.U. 2005, n. 111 (It.), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05080l.htm
[https://perma.cc/MDC4-Y7WW]).
258
Cesare Galli, Procedures and Strategies for Anti-Counterfeiting: Italy, WORLD
TRADEMARK REV. (May 14, 2019), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anticounterfeiting/procedures-and-strategies-anti-counterfeiting-italy-1
[https://perma.cc/7TFH-2KYX].
254
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were “aware of the presence of suspicious material” and did not take
measures to remove it,259 but it is unclear if there is an exception to
online marketplaces. However, in cracking down on the counterfeit
industry, Italian law suggests there is little burden on the
rightsholder, which has not been the case in Tiffany. Additionally,
Italian law has teeth in its targeted approach to both the supply and
demand of counterfeiting.260
Although France and Italy appear to be rightsholder-friendly,
their laws could become even more favorable to brands due to Europe’s Digital Markets Act (the “DMA”) and Digital Services Act
(the “DSA”), proposed in December 2020.261 The DMA establishes
criteria for determining whether an online platform is a gatekeeper
and provides obligations for the gatekeepers.262 The DSA also imposes obligations for entities, such as intermediary services, hosting
services, and online platforms,263 including online marketplaces.264
One of its missions is to provide greater democratic control and
oversight of platforms for society at large.265 Contrary to Tiffany,
both Acts aim to boost digital competition and protect individuals
from harm, and ensure other players are not prevented from competing.266 The Acts also solidify France and Italy’s anti-counterfeiting
measures by imposing fines for large online platforms that fail to
259

Id.
See Martínez, supra note 234, at 529–30.
261
See generally EU Digital Services Act Set to Bring in New Rules for Tech Giants,
BBC
(Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55307115
[https://perma.cc/26PA-P9PQ].
262
The Digital Markets Act: Ensuring Fair and Open Digital Markets, EUROPEAN
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digitalage/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en
[https://perma.cc/K3UF-9NMR].
263
The Digital Services Act: Ensuring a Safe and Accountable Online Environment,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fitdigital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en
[https://perma.cc/4K3C-3J83].
264
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limit illegal material, including counterfeit goods.267 As a result,
online marketplaces will have to appoint independent auditors to ensure compliance with the new rules,268 suggesting responsibility will
not fall on rightsholders.
E. The SHOP SAFE Act
Recognizing the counterfeit problem, a bipartisan group proposed the “Stopping Harmful Offers on Platforms by Screening
Against Fakes in E-Commerce Act of 2020,” better known as the
SHOP SAFE Act.269 With the change in elected officials, Congress
archived the SHOP SAFE Act.270 However, given two of the bill’s
representatives remain in the House271 and that legislators recognize
the significant counterfeit problem, Congress members may introduce similar legislation. Because the SHOP SAFE Act presented a
significant milestone in proposed anti-counterfeiting legislation, this
Note aims to improve upon its legacy for future legislation.
The SHOP SAFE Act amended the Lanham Act to provide contributory liability for e-commerce platforms for the use of counterfeit marks by a third-party seller on their platforms.272 The House
Committee on the Judiciary recognized consumers should trust what
they see—namely what they purchase online is what they will receive.273 Therefore, the Act aimed to tackle the gaps in e-commerce
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systems to stop counterfeit sales.274 However, the SHOP SAFE Act
did not seek to alter Tiffany’s stance on direct liability for trademark
infringement on online platforms.275
The Act was intended to impose liability for online marketplaces
if a third-party sells counterfeit products which pose a risk to consumer health and safety.276 It defined “goods that implicate health
and safety” as “goods the use of which can lead to illness, disease,
injury, serious adverse event, allergic reaction, or death if produced
without compliance with all applicable Federal, State, and local
health and safety regulations and industry-designated testing, safety,
quality, certification, manufacturing, packaging, and labeling standards.”277
Further, the Act imposed contributory liability for infringing
online platforms, unless they take actions to satisfy ten best practices,278 forming a safe harbor. The safe harbor requirements require
the seller (1) verify the seller’s identity, location, and contact information;279 (2) verify and attest the goods are not counterfeit;280 (3)
agree to not sell counterfeits and consent to being sued in the United
States court system;281 (4) display the seller’s identity, location, and
contact information, as well as where the goods are made and where
the goods will be shipped from;282 (5) use images that accurately
depict the goods and ensure the seller “owns or has permission to
use” such depictions;283 (6) use technology to screen for counterfeits;284 (7) implement a timely takedown process;285 (8) terminate
https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2838
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sellers who have listed or sold counterfeit goods three times;286 (9)
screen sellers to prevent terminated sellers from creating new accounts on the platform;287 and (10) share an infringing seller’s information with law-enforcement and, upon request, the owner of the
registered trademark.288
III. BETTER AND STRONGER: ARGUMENTS FOR MORE ROBUST ANTICOUNTERFEITING MEASURES

It is virtually impossible for small businesses to protect themselves from counterfeiting; thus, government intervention is necessary.289 Online marketplaces have further exacerbated the issue.290
This Part argues the proposed anti-counterfeiting legislation, the
SHOP SAFE Act, should be revised based on the lessons from the
DMCA report and foreign law. Section III.A highlights the problems with the SHOP SAFE Act by examining its limitations on the
availability of recourse and how it amplifies the inefficiencies of
Tiffany. Section III.B proposes three areas where legislators should
focus on improving the SHOP SAFE Act.291 Finally, Section III.C
discusses how courts should broadly interpret limiting language in
legislation.
A. A Brand’s Perspective: The SHOP SAFE Act’s Impact on
Rightsholders
Activists have called on Congress to address liability of online
marketplaces for counterfeit sales.292 Significant anti-counterfeiting
initiatives taken by Amazon, for example, attempt to get ahead of
anti-counterfeiting legislation.293 However, these efforts ignore
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more demanding measures, such as preventing repeat infringers.294
Despite online marketplaces’ attempts at mitigating counterfeit
goods on their platforms, more needs to be done. Thus, this Section
illustrates how the SHOP SAFE Act limits the availability of recourse and is inefficient for rightsholders by adding a safe harbor.
1. The SHOP SAFE Act Limits the Availability of Recourse
for Rightsholders
The SHOP SAFE Act limits itself to goods that implicate health
and safety.295 Accordingly, the Act’s language suggests online marketplaces can avoid liability if the goods do not involve health and
safety. For small business owners, like Mindy,296 this limitation
means seeing their hard work counterfeited on the virtual shelves of
virtual stores and not having viable options of recourse. A savvy
investigator may be able to find and police counterfeits online, but
not always. Often, rightsholders are unaware counterfeiters use their
name, similar to Brush Hero and Fuse Chicken’s case.297 Only recently have online marketplaces increased their pursuit of removing
counterfeit listings on their platforms. However, these marketplaces
do not have an incentive to do better because current domestic law
weighs in their favor,298 and courts will most likely apply Tiffany if
a rightsholder brings a lawsuit.299 Thus, it is an injustice for the
SHOP SAFE Act to have such limiting language, leaving rightsholders with very little recourse available.
In the plight of brands and retailers against online marketplaces
and their third-party sellers, Tiffany’s knowledge requirement
proves to be an obstacle. However, it is unclear if courts will implement a knowledge requirement because the SHOP SAFE Act does
not explicitly address it.300 If courts implement a knowledge
294
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requirement, rightsholders would be unable to alleviate the costs of
monitoring and performing test buys. In light of these considerations, the availability of recourse for rightsholders remains limited.
2. The SHOP SAFE Act is Inefficient for Rightsholders
The takedown and termination requirements in the SHOP SAFE
Act are highly inefficient for rightsholders because there is not
enough legislative guidance adequately shifting the burden to online
marketplaces. First, the Act requires online marketplaces to implement a timely takedown program of counterfeit listings.301 However,
the Act does not provide a regulatory framework for doing so and
does not explicitly speak to the time range for the takedown. Although the SHOP SAFE Act provides contributory liability to online
marketplaces selling counterfeit goods that implicate health and
safety, its takedown provision is completely lacking in any efficiency to alleviate the burden on brands. For example, if numerous
storefronts sell counterfeit versions of the legitimate goods across
various online marketplaces, test buys become costly and time-consuming. Additionally, sellers on online marketplaces often use pictures of the legitimate product for marketing,302 which causes problems for rightsholders to prove the item is a counterfeit. Even though
there is litigation surrounding reselling on online marketplaces,303
the process for removing counterfeit goods is frustrating.
For small businesses, online marketplaces are not quick to jump
to their aid.304 They may remove some listings, but many online
marketplaces simply ignore these rightsholders.305 Even for major
brands such as Tiffany, the burden is still on the brand to police
counterfeits. By not providing a regulatory process or framework in
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the SHOP SAFE Act, online marketplaces may institute bare minimum changes to the systems they have in place now.
The SHOP SAFE Act also poorly addresses repeat infringers. In
its termination requirement, the Act requires online marketplaces to
terminate sellers who engage in more than three instances of using
a counterfeit mark.306 Although “more than three instances” is a specific threshold, there remains a high potential for confusion. For example, “three instances” could indicate the number of times a seller
engages in counterfeit activity or the number of listings using a
counterfeit mark.
The termination requirement is also vague as it does not address
whether “seller” refers to criminal networks or the storefronts themselves. The lack of clarification can alter the liability for online marketplaces. As a result, a vague definition of “seller” may allow these
online platforms to avoid liability as the SHOP SAFE Act may not
apply to third-party sellers engaging in sophisticated counterfeit operations. When looking at other legislation relating to online marketplaces, ‘seller’ is defined more precisely.307 Thus, the absence of
an explicit definition presents an issue of inefficiency for rightsholders.
Although the SHOP SAFE Act requires sellers to be verified and
subject to U.S. jurisdiction,308 this requirement will not stop the
sellers if the termination requirement is not clarified. As discussed,
counterfeit sellers are often outside of U.S. jurisdiction,309 and
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foreign markets frequently make counterfeit goods.310 An online
marketplace may satisfy the verification requirement by including a
little check box, but this check box provides no strong deterrent.
Further, in cases where the counterfeit seller operates outside of the
U.S., the courts may likely dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdiction. However, if online marketplaces attempt to exclude foreign
sellers, there could be a significant controversy of discrimination.
Lastly, counterfeit sellers can circumvent termination using a virtual
private network (“VPN”) to set their location to the U.S., even if
they do not do business or reside there. Once terminated, counterfeit
sellers may repeatedly create new virtual storefronts311 with new
names or VPNs. Considering these concerns, the lack of guidance
for how online marketplaces satisfy the termination requirement
presents a problem.
B. Amending Anti-Counterfeiting Legislation
Regulations imposed on online marketplaces in combating
counterfeit goods should improve rather than limit the options and
efficiencies for rightsholders. Consumers purchasing goods they believe are legitimate should not be subject to the ongoing tensions
between online marketplaces and rightsholders. On the other hand,
rightsholders are limited in their capacity to ensure consumers are
purchasing their legitimate goods. This Section presents several areas where Congress should bear in mind when crafting anti-counterfeiting legislation.
1. Widen the Scope of Liability for Online Marketplaces to
Cover More than “Goods That Implicate Health and
Safety”
Congress should remove language limiting liability to goods that
implicate health and safety as the Act—as currently written—does
not address Tiffany. Although it may impose liability for the most
dangerous counterfeit items, online marketplaces can still avoid liability. The benefit of removing such language broadens liability,
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allowing small businesses, such as MinMac, Fuse Chicken, or Brush
Hero,312 to pursue legal accountability of online platforms.
In addition to removing the limiting language, the SHOP SAFE
Act should consider clarifying the general knowledge standard
courts apply through the Inwood test. The clarification should read,
“online marketplaces shall be contributorily liable if they were
aware of the infringing counterfeits and failed to remove it.” This
clarification aligns with Italian law as it relates to the country’s
stance on service providers.313 A potential drawback would be an
unsavory judicial interpretation of “awareness,” seemingly bringing
us back to square one, along with the potential for courts to heighten
this standard. However, the SHOP SAFE Act should specify the
goal is to lower the general knowledge standard established by Tiffany. In this situation, courts are put on notice when determining
whether there is contributory trademark liability. This proposal is
also in line with the Copyright Office’s suggestion of clarifying the
DMCA’s actual knowledge and red flag knowledge requirement and
Senator Tillis’ discussion draft for modernizing copyright law in
lowering the knowledge standard.314 When the SHOP SAFE Act includes a clear knowledge standard, the explicit clarification puts parties on notice and aids efficiency for rightsholders and the judicial
system. Here, courts and parties will know the applicable standard.
Drawing from the Copyright Office’s suggestion of clarifying
the DMCA’s willful blindness standard, Congress should specify
where willful blindness is enough to meet the knowledge requirement. The clarification should read, “willful blindness applies where
the online marketplace intentionally shielded itself from finding
counterfeit activity even where the platform was generally aware of
such activity.” Tiffany reasoned that willful blindness may trigger
Inwood, but generally knowing counterfeit activity is on the platform is not enough for legal liability.315 Without explicit clarification, courts may look to Tiffany and rule in favor of a higher bar for
willful blindness. This revision shifts the burden to the online

312
313
314
315

Supra Introduction.
See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.C.3 and Section II.C.4.
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010).

1346

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:1302

marketplace to actively police for counterfeits by removing the
shield of general awareness. Thus, if these online platforms do not
want to be liable for contributory trademark infringement, such clarification encourages online marketplaces to ensure counterfeit
goods are not sold on their platforms.
In widening the scope of the SHOP SAFE Act, Congress should
include a provision, “any online marketplace that introduces counterfeit goods into the United States shall be liable for contributory
trademark infringement.” Drawing on the French eBay cases,316
such provision will be a victory for rightsholders and consumer protections in online shopping, as the change in language reaches outside the scope of “goods that implicate health and safety.” However,
the provision may employ more stringent implications on importing
goods into the country, which means there is a potential for imported
goods to be heavily searched for counterfeits, creating inefficiency
in the trade importation process.317 If Congress specifies it is the
online marketplaces’ responsibility to ensure goods sold on the platform are legitimate goods before the goods are sold and shipped,
this provision’s legislative purpose could remedy the trade efficiency concern. Therefore, this proposal may alleviate the burden
on the rightsholder.
In widening liability, the SHOP SAFE Act should also forbid
online marketplaces from selling the prevailing party’s products if
found contributorily liable. This proposal aligns with French law restricting eBay from selling LVMH perfumes318 and gives online
marketplaces an incentive to be more diligent in removing counterfeit sellers and listings.
2. Implement a Regulatory Process for Takedowns
New anti-counterfeiting legislation should include a regulatory
process for takedowns. Although the DMCA imposes requirements
for its notice-and-takedown system,319 an effective list for Congress
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to require of online marketplaces would be to obtain the (1) identification of the legitimate trademark, (2) the identification of the infringing listing, (3) the shipping address of the infringing listing, (4)
a statement the complaining party is acting in good faith, and (5) a
statement the notice is accurate. Although these obligations are similar to the obligations found in the SHOP SAFE Act, as the Act is
currently written, online marketplaces may shove these similar requirements onto rightsholders. In fact, online marketplaces already
shift this burden to rightsholders.320 Therefore, these requirements
must be taken by the online platforms themselves, especially since
they can obtain the information easily than the legitimate owner.
The benefit of including the identification of the legitimate
trademark and infringing listing provisions is to facilitate simple
comparisons. Although some counterfeit sellers use pictures of the
legitimate product in their listings,321 some may not. In the latter
scenario, the online marketplace can obtain identification of the legitimate trademark and the infringing listing to show the listing potentially engages in counterfeit activity. Obtaining identification allows for an expeditated process to remove the counterfeit listings. A
potential drawback would be in determining if a listing is using legitimate images. The SHOP SAFE Act compels online marketplaces
to require sellers to use images that accurately depict the actual
goods.322 This requirement is not only vague, but it is not attached
to the takedown process and does not address sellers who may be
disguising themselves as a reseller. If the images are the same, the
shipping address of the infringing listing may indicate whether the
item is likely to be a counterfeit item. As discussed, if an item is
shipped from China, there may be a higher likelihood the item is a
counterfeit.323 However, there is the question of whether relying on
the shipping address excludes legitimate goods coming from foreign
countries. As a response, Congress should specify this provision
320
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merely acts as a layer of security to conclude whether the items are
likely counterfeit.
Lastly, obtaining a statement of good faith and a statement the
notice is accurate acts as a deterrent for bad actors who may want to
take a listing down with no legitimate belief the listing is of their
counterfeit item. It is not likely an issue for Congress to include such
provisions since the French courts suggest online marketplaces have
a civil responsibility for the goods sold on its platform.324 By including such provisions in legislation, Congress can adequately resolve
the inefficiencies of the takedown requirement.
The SHOP SAFE Act should also reject the imposition of test
buys on the complaining party. Including such a provision—that explicitly states this rejection—benefits the rightsholder by alleviating
financial burdens. However, there should be some verification the
item is a counterfeit. Therefore, the SHOP SAFE Act should encourage online marketplaces to provide a buyback program targeting disgruntled customers who believe they have received a counterfeit
item. When the online marketplace receives the alleged counterfeit
item, they can compare it to the authentic item and remove the listing and seller under an explicit and reasonable statutory period, such
as forty-eight hours.
3. Clarify the Termination Requirement
The SHOP SAFE Act includes a termination requirement that
the online marketplace must terminate sellers who have listed or
sold counterfeit goods three times.325 Similar to the DMCA report
on repeat infringer policies,326 anti-counterfeiting laws would benefit from legislative guidance on compliance with this requirement.
As discussed, three times is ambiguous, and it is simply too many
instances. Suppose a counterfeit seller sells multiple counterfeit
items from one listing, has numerous counterfeit listings in its store,
or has multiple storefronts with counterfeit items. In this case, the
damage is done by the time the online marketplace finds three instances of counterfeit selling. Therefore, legislation, such as the
324
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SHOP SAFE Act, should require a strict one-time infringement policy applying to the onset of the first counterfeit sale by a storefront.
Legislation should also require online marketplaces to implement a
tracking system to flag suspicious activity in detecting the first counterfeit sale. A one-time infringement policy signals to counterfeit
sellers that the online marketplace will not tolerate the sale of counterfeit goods. It also safeguards rightsholders from constantly sending notices to the online marketplace to terminate the seller or the
listing.
Though there is an issue of how online marketplaces would
know when counterfeit selling is occurring and thus when to stop
the sales after the first instance, the SHOP SAFE Act should require
online marketplaces to implement tracking systems. These tracking
systems will ensure new sellers are not repeat infringers by using
current technologies to flag when suspicious activity is afoot. This
flag should trigger human review and further investigation by the
online marketplace. By including this provision in the termination
requirement, the burden on rightsholders likely decreases and ensures counterfeit goods are not sold on the platform multiple times
by the same users. Requiring an online marketplace to implement a
tracking system further encourages efficiency for rightsholders. It
also complements the SHOP SAFE Act’s requirement to use technology to screen for counterfeits before the goods appear on the platform.327
A potential drawback concerns individuals’ right to privacy: a
balancing act between data collection and consent. However, if a
seller wants to sell products on an online marketplace, legislation
should require marketplaces obtain consent from the seller. In obtaining consent, the SHOP SAFE Act should require platforms include a provision in their terms of service and give notice to thirdparty sellers when they set up their virtual storefronts. Legislation
should also require online marketplaces to notify sellers that the
platform employs tracking technology to ensure sellers are not engaging in counterfeit operations.
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On the other hand, online marketplaces may argue anti-counterfeiting legislation will cause them to lose their business to foreign
online marketplaces with more lenient rules. However, legislation,
such as the SHOP SAFE Act, should explicitly state these measures
apply to any and all e-commerce websites with third-party sellers
who sell to U.S. consumers. Therefore, it will be unlikely online
marketplaces, such as Amazon and eBay, will lose their market
share to foreign online platforms.
The SHOP SAFE Act should also expand the definition of
“sellers” who are subject to removal. General requirements, such as
the SHOP SAFE Act’s termination requirement, leave room for
online marketplaces to implement their processes, which has been
inefficient for rightsholders.328 Thus, the SHOP SAFE Act should
change its language surrounding third-party sellers and expand it to
include persons or organizations engaging in counterfeit sales. The
termination requirement will then be more robust and will also address criminal networks. Additionally, Congress should require
online marketplaces terminate sellers operating multiple storefronts
if found to be selling counterfeit goods. This expansion takes the
pressure from rightsholders to find and police third-party sellers and
places pressure on marketplaces to ensure counterfeit goods do not
plague their platforms.
Lastly, the SHOP SAFE Act’s termination requirement needs a
strong deterrent. In France, the court ruled against eBay, forbidding
the online marketplace from selling LVMH perfumes,329 arguably
acting as a deterrent. Mimicking this ruling, the SHOP SAFE Act
should include a provision in the termination requirement requiring
online marketplaces to implement arbitration agreements. These arbitration agreements would apply to third-party sellers found selling
counterfeit goods. Drawing on Europe’s proposals in the DMA and
the DSA,330 the Act should require online marketplaces to impose
fines if third-party sellers are found liable through arbitration. Further, inspired by the French LVMH case, the SHOP SAFE Act
should require if the third-party is liable, they will no longer be able
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to sell through the online platform. Although this proposal may not
deter all counterfeit sellers, it should deter a significant portion of
them.
C. Court Interpretation of Goods that Implicate Health and Safety
If Congress passes anti-counterfeiting legislation limited to
goods that implicate health and safety, the last Hail Mary is how a
court interprets which goods implicate health and safety. Some
products may fall under goods implicating health and safety if they
have indirect adverse effects on individuals, such as workplace hazards or hazardous chemicals on the items. Counterfeit goods are
made in unsafe and unsanitary conditions, have ties to criminal organizations, and damage the economy,331 indirectly impacting
health and safety.
In determining if a counterfeit implicates health and safety,
courts should look towards the conditions of the good’s source. For
example, because counterfeit items are not usually made in safe conditions,332 workers are put at significant risk when making counterfeit products. Additionally, because counterfeit items are manufactured in toxic conditions, those toxins can find themselves into or
onto the counterfeit product in some form.333 Thus, there are implications of health and safety simply due to the factories or locations
of these operations.
Courts may also consider the individuals behind the counterfeit
goods in determining whether they implicate health and safety. For
criminal organizations, the money these networks make from selling
counterfeit goods goes to illicit activities such as drug trafficking
and terrorism.334 These illicit activities could impact health and
safety, especially if criminal organizations’ networks extend into the
U.S. Lastly, courts should take into consideration the damage to the
economy. Because the sale of counterfeit goods is partially responsible for unemployment,335 the economy’s health is also affected.
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See supra Section I.A.2.
Counterfeits and Their Impact on Consumer Health And Safety, supra note 63.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 38, at 16–18.
See JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELL. PROP., supra note 61, at 42.
See supra Section I.A.2; see also FRONTIER ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 5.
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This proposal may be an overextension of the judicial system,
but it is worth arguing because many rightsholders do not have other
options to hold online marketplaces contributorily liable. Looking
at indirect impacts on health and safety presents some hope, albeit
in an extremely narrow way. If anti-counterfeiting laws do not address the full scope of problems associated with Tiffany, rightsholders who want to pursue legal action should consider this avenue.
CONCLUSION

The United States’ attempt at fighting the battle of counterfeiting
on online marketplaces has been lackluster, but there is hope for
anti-counterfeiting legislation. Although understandably health and
safety come first for American lives, there remain serious financial
and reputational harms Congress should address. In regard to online
marketplaces, safe harbors are inefficient, and Congress should consider new legislation that holds online marketplaces contributorily
liable and mitigates harms in addition to those implicating health
and safety. With the Internet continuously growing, more forms of
online marketplaces are becoming available, such as on social media
platforms like Facebook and Instagram. As mentioned, social media
becomes a hotbed for counterfeiters to target consumers,336 which
further increases the agency for anti-counterfeiting legislation.
Until legislation can mitigate most—if not all—negative impacts, rightsholders may need to look towards other technologies.
Such measures include the use of blockchain technology or specialized codes on products to ensure resale items are authentic. What is
clear is the proposal detailed in this Note regarding the prevalent
dupes on online marketplaces is reasonable to protect rightsholders
and consumers from the harms of the counterfeit industry.

336

See supra Section I.A.2.

